Americans have been voting on electronic voting machines for over 20 years, proving that the technology is secure and accurate. Electronic voting machines have a demonstrated, decades-long record of accuracy and reliability. There has never been a documented case of vote tampering through the use of an electronic voting machine. Every documented case of vote tampering in America has involved non-electronic voting technology. To ensure the continued record of tamper-free voting, electronic voting machines are tested for security and accuracy by their manufacturers, states or counties in which they are being certified, and independent certification testing labs. Electronic voting machine manufacturers submit their software code to federal, state, and local government authorities. These entities check to ensure the software used on Election Day is the same software as that certified for accuracy.
Security and quality are of paramount importance to Hart InterCivic. The Hart Voting System has proven to be secure and accurate. The Hart Voting System is regulated at both the federal and state levels. Symantec, an acknowledged leader in technology security, has also independently audited the Hart Voting System. Hart has attained certification under the internationally recognized: ISO 27001:2005 standard for information security.
If recounts are necessary for a given election, jurisdictions can conduct the recounts using the electronic voting machines. After each ballot is cast, a Cast Vote Record (CVR) is generated and stored instantaneously in multiple, physically separate, nonvolatile, electronic storage locations. A complete, electronic recount of an election is easily accomplished with the Hart Voting System by rereading each Mobile Ballot Box (MBB) memory card for the specified election into a 'fresh' Tally database. The process duplicates the one used in the original tabulation, and provides the same results report, audit trails, and backup options. In the event that the law requires hand counting of paper ballots, the CVRs can be printed or the voter verifiable paper audit trail can be used.
Hart InterCivic has a voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), which enables voters to review a paper summary of their ballot choices. We call our solution the Verifiable Ballot Option, or VBO. The VBO can be fitted to the eSlate at the customer's request without having to replace existing equipment. This option is available to Hart InterCivic customers on a state-by-state basis, depending on state requirements.
The Hart Voting System features a series of redundant and auditable measures to ensure accuracy and security. The system's eSlate device allows the voter to double-check the ballot before casting it. Once cast, multiple copies of the electronic ballot are saved simultaneously in different locations, making lost data or undetectable fraud virtually impossible. Each of the records can be verified and audited for security and accuracy. The eSlate's SELECT Wheel interface does not require calibration like touch screen systems. There is no chance of false touches due to ballot images that are misaligned with touch sensors.
The digital voting technology in Hart's eScan is more accurate and secure than optical scanning systems. Like the eSlate, the eScan provides triple redundancy of the voter's choices: on the MBB flash memory card, within the eScan memory, and on the original marked paper ballot. The scanned paper ballots are secured in a locked ballot box connected to the eScan. The eScan also provides an electronic audit log that records all actions performed on the device with a date-time stamp. The audit log can be printed out as needed by the jurisdiction.
Security has been a fundamental design concept for the Hart Voting System from the beginning. Design decisions made even before the System's release are now being validated by recent events. The Hart Voting System includes both physical and electronic intrusion detection controls, such as standard election seals and time-stamped transaction logs that record every system action related to the voting process. From the Hart Voting System's embedded, real-time operating system at the polling place to the System's unique polling place control and management features, the Hart Voting System has been designed for security.
Several key principles are at the foundation of the Hart Voting System's design:
- Multiple Layers of Defense. Security features have been established in a manner that requires an attacker to overcome multiple obstacles to reach a target. The Hart Voting System includes several key process areas where this is the case, for example, as the system's multiple original storage of cast vote records.
- Segmentation. The Hart Voting System was intentionally designed with multiple, individual components that are allowed to communicate with each other only when a need to do so arises. This approach provides distributed processing of data, with each component verifying and authenticating the output of the previous component. The distributed architecture establishes multiple, independent data paths through the system that are cross-verified throughout the election process.
- Standalone Security. Each component of the Hart Voting System is secure on its own, and not dependent on any other component for its security. Additionally, each component maintains its own audit logs, recording each transaction that occurs and noting errors or anomalies.
- Encryption. Hart has implemented cryptography in all functions of its election software and election data exchange points. This additional and robust layer of 128-bit encryption provides a high level of data security throughout the election process.